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CASES
COURTS-EFFECT OF RULES OF COURT. Hermann Savings Bank v.
Kroppl-The appellant who had duly filed a "short form"transcript failed
to file an abstract of the record as required by rule eleven of the Supreme
2
Court made under the express authority of a statute. The penalty
fixed by the court In rule sixteen for non-compliance with this rule
is dismissal of the appeal or continuance of the case at the option of
the respondent; but the respondent in this case sought an affirmance
of the judgment to avoid the possible release of the sureties on the
supersedeas bonds. The court en bane refused to affirm the judgment
and dismissed the appeal; this result seems to have been due In
some measure to the court's unwillingness to change its rule by construction or by the substitution of a new rule. It was said that a
rule "made in aid of, and under direct authority of a Solemn statute has practically the binding force and effect of a statute," and the
court added, "If we are to change It, we ought to change its substance and not nullify it by an indirect collateral attack."

1. (1915) 181 S. W. 86.
2. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2048.

(56)
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The result of this decision seems to accord with the established
practice of the appellate courts of the state and the case is noted here
only because of the announced attitude of the court en banc toward its
own rules. Does a rule of court ever present itself to the court which
promulgates it with the binding effect of a statute? Upon the answer
to this question may depend to some extent the desirability of conferring on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate a code of procedure and practice. In commending this reform to the Missouri Bar
Association in 1913, a special committee on judicial administration and
legal procedure expressed the "belief that the rules made by the court
itself to facilitate the decision of a case upon its merits will be construed accordingly and not as a legislative enactment, which because
it is a legislative enactment must be enforced according to its literal
terms, even tho justice fails and the heavens fall."3 Perhaps this expression was too sanguine in view of the quotation in the preceding
paragraph. The attitude of the court toward past and present rules
may be made the basis of a forecast of its attitude toward rules of
practice under the proposed enlargement of its powers.
A study of the decisions of the Missouri appellate courts seems
to indicate that the expression in the principal case is in line with the
attitude of those courts in the past. In Harding v. BedoJl4 where the
respondent urged the insufficiency of the appellant's abstract, the court
declared that its rules "apply to all persons, all cases and all representatives, alike, and must be construed in one case just as they have
been or will be in another, irrespective of the case, the parties or their
counsel." This statement was quoted with approval in Kolokas v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co.,i where it was asserted that rules of practice must
either be abrogated altogether or obeyed as interpreted. In Hayes v.
Fooso it was held that a rule requiring an exception to the overruling
of a motion to be shown in the appellant's abstract was established
for the purpose of facilitating the business of the court and that an
absence of such showing would be considered by the court tho not
raised by the opposing counsel. It may be conceded that parties should
not be allowed to waive compliance with such rules; the conclusion seems equally irresistible that neither should they be allowed to
7
insist upon their observance. In Crothers v. Laforce, the appellant
having failed to file an abstract as required by rule pleaded his ignorance of the rule as an excuse and asked for a continuance in order
that the abstract might be prepared. The court's reply was flat and
"We must either live up to our rules or abanuncompromising:
S.

4.
5.
6.
7.

1913 Proceedings of Missouri Bar Association, p. 127.
(1906) 202 Mo. 625, 100 S. W. 638.
(1909) 223 Mo. 455, 122 S.W. 1082.
(1909) 223 Mo. 421, 122 S. W. 1038.
(1911) 241 Mo. 365, 145 S.W. 99.
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don them. This rule is essential to the prompt and proper disposition
of cases in this court. It is a lawyer's duty to know and conform to
the rules.
. . . We dislike to dispose of a case without looking
into the merits but justice to litigants and lawyers who properly prepare their cases requires us to enforce the rules. This cause is
reached for decision in its regular course. The respondent is entitled
to have it decided and stands on the rules."
Where the rules of trial courts are involved the courts have assumed a more liberal attitude, refusing to review the discretion of
the lower court. In Kuh v. Garvin,8 where the trial court had allowed an amended interplea to be filed after the time fixed by rule,
the court said that "courts have control of their own rules and it
rests very much In their discretion as to whether they shall be rigidly
enforced or not. We are not prepared to say that such discretion was
abused or unreasonably exercised in this case."
The reports of other American jurisdictions are replete with judicial assertions of the binding character of a rule of court. In Magnuson v. Billings,9 speaking of a rule fixing a stage beyond which pleadings might not be filed, the court said that "a rule of court is a law
of practice, extended alike to all litigants who come within its purview, and who in conducting their cases, have the right to assume
that it will be uniformly enforced by the court in conservation of
their rights as well as to secure the prompt and orderly dispatch
of business." Numerous cases may be cited to the same effect.1O However, there are to be found some cases which refuse to regard rules of
court in such a light. In Mitchell v. Rushing," the court conceded
that the appellant's brief violated most of the rules adopted for guidance
in the preparation of cases for appeal yet since "to refuse to consider
the assignments in this case because of the failure to comply with
those rules would result in the miscarriage of justice," it refused to
sustain the appellees' objection. And on rehearing it added, "We understand that the rules which it is claimed were violated in presenting the assignments on this appeal were adopted for the convenience of the appellate courts, to aid In the rapid and orderly dispatch
of business and are directory only." In M. K. & T. By. Co. v. Kidd,12
8. (1894)
S. NV.504.
9.

125 Mo. 646. Cf. Rigden v. Ferguson (1902)

(1899) 152 Ind. 177, 52 N. E. 802.

172 Mo. 49, 72

10. Hayden v. Superior Court (1913) 22 Cal. App. 23, 133 Pac. 26; McRae v. Preston (1907) 54 Fla. 188, 44 So. 711; Royal Neighbors v. Sitmon
(1907) 135 Ill. App. 509: Price v. Svartz (1912) 49 Ind. App. 627, 97 N. E.
938; Webster v. Bligh (1912) 50 Ind. App. 56, 98 N. E. 73; State ex rel. Connors v. Foster (1907) 36 Mont. 278, 92 1'ac. 761; Beco v. Tonopah Extension
Mining Co. (Nev., 1914) 141 'oc. 453; Hendry V. Carttcright (1907) 14 N. Al.
72, 89 Pae. 309; Carpenter V. Pirner (1907) 107 N. Y. S. 875; Cohen v. Cohen
(1914) 145 N. Y. S. 652; St. Germain v. Bouchard (1913) 36 R. I. 35, 88 Ad.
802; Rio Grande etc. v. Gildersleeve (1899) 174 U. S. 603. See 75 Cent.
L. J. 384.
11. (1909) 55 Tex. Civ. App. 281, 118 S. W. 582. Cf. Childress v.
Robinson (191.3) 161 S. W. 78, decided by the same court.
12.

(1906)

146 Fed. 499.
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the court declared that when rules designed to facilitate the proper discharge of the court's duties are disregarded, it is discretionary with
the court whether it will enforce the prescribed penalty.13
It would seem that neither practical nor theoretical considerations
compel the conclusion that a rule of court has the binding effect of a
statute. Where the court promulgates a rule solely to facilitate the
transaction of its business, the court only should be in a position to
insist upon its observance, the matter lying wholly within its discretion. And even, where the rule is one that affects the substantive
rights of the parties, the court should not refuse to suspend it In a
particular case where the rule works a hardship. In any case rules
should in the interests of justice be construed liberally and in accordance with the spirit and purpose with which they were adopted; they
do not demand the same literal observance which is due to rules imposed upon courts by the enactment of another body. While in many
of the cases cited above the same results would probably be reached
on the ground that sufficient reason for a non-observance of the rule had
not been shown, the propriety of a flat denial of the court's power to
dispense with their observance may well be questioned. It is difficult
to see why, as in Crothers v. Laforce, a court should feel that the existence of a rule presents the alternative of enforcing it in all cases or
of abandoning it altogther. Indeed, the fact that injustice or hardship on a litigant would ensue from the enforcement of the rule indicates that a change is necessary, and a suspension of the rule in a
particular case would be tantamount to its amendment so far as it
applies to that class of cases. One should not be too hasty In drawing
the conclusion that this attitude would be persisted in if the Supreme Court were given greater power to control procedure by rules; it
is not unreasonable to expect that the spirit of the suggested reform
will work a change in the spirit of judicial construction as well. The
whole reform movement is a revolt against the too thoro mechanization of procedure; flexibility is the keynote and flexibility can be attained only by reposing discretion in those who administer justice.
Unless courts view their rules in the light of these principles, a great
advantage of conferring upon them power to regulate procedure will
have been lost.14
DEAlr H. LEOPARD
13. See also Continental etc. Association v. Woolff (1009) 11 Cal. App.
677, 106 Pac. 107 (reasonable discretion should be exercised by appellate courts
in applying rules); Indiana Union 'raction Co. v. Heller (1909) 44 Ind. App.
385, 89 N. E. 419 (appellate rules to receive liberal construction); Sanborn v.
Boston & Maine R. It. (1911) 76 N. H. 65. 79 Atl. 642 (trial judge may suspend
rule of superior court); Schultze v. Huttlinger (1912) 135 N. Y. S. "80 (rules
not to be given a strained and technical construction) ; Sylvcster v. Olson
(1911) 63 Wash. 285, 115 Pac. 175 (observance of rules of trial courts lies
within discretion of trial judge); Burgc v. lobinson (1903) 123 Fed. 262
(rule made for protection of court may be waived when justice requires);
Omaha etc. Co. v. Omaha (1914) 216 Fed. 848 (court may set aside rule in
an exceptional case).
14. See an excellent article by Professor Pound, "Some Principles of
Procedural Reform", 4 Illinois Law Review 388, 491.
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WHERE

ONE
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IS

DEAD. Leavea v. Southern Railway Company.'-The plaintiff brought
an action for damages caused by an assault committed by the watchman of the defendant corporation. The Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff was disqualified by the statute2 from testifying as to what
took place at the time of the assault, because the defendant's servant
who committed the assault was dead. The effect of this was to overrule
the decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals In Drew v. Wabash
Railway Co.,3 of which the Supreme Court expressly disapproved.
The common law disqualification of witnesses because of interest
was recognized in the early Missouri declslons.4 It was abolished by
the statute of 1855 which provided that no witness should be excluded because of interest, but which expressly left a party to the action incompetent.5 By the statute of 1865 it was provided that no
one should be disqualified as a witness in a civil suit because of hie
interest as a party, except that, "where one of the original parties
to the contract or cause of action in Issue and on trial is dead, or is
shown to the court to be insane, the other party shall not be admitted to
testify in his own favor."e In 1887 the provision that a party to the contract In issue could not testify In favor of anyone claiming under him, was
added.7 The purpose of this statute was to prevent an undue advantage of the living party over the dead, and to remove the temptation to speak falsely where contradiction is impossible. Professor
Wigmore considers such statutes objectionable even tho strictly construed, and Instead of disqualifying the living party, he would rather
give the other side a chance to be heard by admitting declarations of
the deceased party concerning the transaction.8 As he has pointed
out, the statute Is open to the same objections as the Interest rule, In
that It shuts off entirely one source from which the court may learn
the truth. It seems that the other side may be safeguarded by having the credibility of the party judged in the light of his Interest, as
Is done In the case of other interested witnesses.
The Missouri statute kept the common law disqualification of
parties in one situation, i.e., where the opposite party is dead, and
it really added a new disqualification in that it disqualified a party
to the contract in issue tho not a party to the suit and without Interest in it. The problems which arise In the application of the statute are due to the difficulty of determining who Is a party to the contract or cause of action. Should the agent who made the contract
1.
2.

(1915) 181 S. W. 7. (1913) 171 Mo. App. 24.
Revised Statutes 1909, 6 0354.
3. (1908) 129 Mo. App. 459, 107 S. W. 478.
4. Rector v. MeNair (1824) 1 Mo. 471; Levy
510; Horine V. Horine (1848) 11 Mo. 649.
5. Revised Statutes 1855, c. 168, p. 1576.
6. General Statutes 1865, p. 586.
7. Laws of 1887, p. 287.
8. Wigmore, Evidence, 4 576, 578.

v.

Hawley (1844)

8 Mo.
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and who, with the exception of the opposite party, is the only one
who knows exactly what the transaction was, be considered a party?
The policy of the Missouri courts has been to so construe the statute as to establish the complete mutuality which they believe was intended.9
In Williams v. Edwards,o it was held that the defendant in an
ejectment suit could not testify concerning a transaction with the
deceased agent of a corporation, by which he claimed the deed of
trust under which the plaintiff claimed was cancelled. The agent
was held "the other party to the contract" on the theory that since
a corporation can act only thru agents, it is necessary to disqualify
anyone from testifying concerning a transaction with an agent the
advantage of whose testimony the corporation is deprived of by his
death, in order that the corporation may have the same protection
that a natural person has. The rule of this case has become well established in later decisionsili Upon the authority of the corporation
cases it has been held that where a contract is made with the agent
of an individual, the death of the agent disqualifies the party contracting
with him.12 However, an agent of a party to the suit was a compe3
tent witness at common law,1 and the Missouri courts have held that
an agent of an individual was not disqualified by statute.14 In Stanton
v. Ryan-l it was held that the defendant's wife who made a contract
as his agent with the plaintiff's deceased partner, was competent to
testify, tho the court suggested that an amendment disqualifying an
agent would be desirable. The defendant himself was held incompetent to testify concerning the contract made by the deceased partner for the partnership.10 In Clark v. Thias,17 one of the later cases
decided by the Supreme Court, the plaintiff sued upon a note which
his clerk had taken from the defendant's testatrix and it was con9. Donnell Newspaper Co. v. Ju"g (1899) 81 Mo. App. 577; Banking
House v. Rood (1896) 132 Mo. 256, 33 S. W. 816; Scott v. Burfiend (1906)
116

Mo.

App. 71, 87 S. IV. 610; Columbia Brewery Co. V. Rohling 1908)

133

Mo. App. 65, 112 S. W. 767.
10. (1887) 94 Mo. 447, 7 S. W. 429.
11. Banking House v. Rood (1896) 132 Mo 256 33 S. W. 816; Sidway
v. Missouri Land & Live Stock Go. (1901) 163 Mo. 34, 63 S. W. 705; Central
Bank V. Thayer (1904) 184 Mo. 61, 82 S. W. 142 ; Charles Green Real Estate
Co. v. Building Co. (1906) 196 Mo. 358. 93 S. W. 1111; Nichols, Shepard 6
Co. v. Jones (1888) 32 Mo. App. 657; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v.
Heath (1896) 65 Mo. App. 461; Nelson v. K. C. Ft. S. & S. Ry. Co. (1896) 66
Mo. App. 647;

Columbia Brewery Co. V. Menke (1908)

133 Mo. App. 65, 112

S. W. 767.
12. Robertson V. Reed (1889) 38 Mo. App. 32: Holmann v. Lange (1898)
143 Mo. 100, 44 S. W. 752; Wendover v. Baker (1804) 121 Mo. 273, 25 S. W.
918 ; Bone v. Friday (1014) 180 Mo. App. 575. 167 S. W. 699.
13. Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed.) 4 416.
14. Stanton v. Ryan (1867) 41 Mo.'510: Baer v. Pfaff (1891) 44 Mo. App.
85: Leahy v. Simpson (1894) 60 Mo. App. 83: Clark v. Thias (1003) 173 Mo.
628, 73 S. W. 616: Jackson v. Smith (1909) 139 Mo. App. 691, 123 S. W. 1026;
Dawson v. Wombles (1004) 104 Mo. App. 272, 78 S. W. 823.
15.

16.
17.

(1867) 41 Mo. 510.

See McClelland v. McClelland (1890) 42 Mo. App. 32; Donnell News(1903) 173 Mo. 628, 73 . W. 616.

paper Co. v. Jung (1899) 81 Mo. App. 577.
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tended that the clerk was incompetent to testify concerning the transaction. The court said that since he was not expressly disqualified by
the statute, the test was whether or not he would have been competent at common law, and it held that the clerk would have been competent for he was not a party and had no interest in the suit; so, since
the statute was intended only to modify the common law to permit
a party with interest to testify in his own behalf where the other
party to the contract or cause of action on trial is alive, the plaintiff's
clerk was not disqualified by it.
However, the doctrine of Stanton v. Ryan and Clark v. Thins is
discredited by recent cases in which the rule is laid down that the
term "party to the contract" is to be construed to mean the person
who negotiated it rather than the person in whose name and interest
it was made, and by this rule the agent is disqualified where the party
he contracted with is dead.18 The cases disapproving of Clark v. Thias
do so on the ground that the witness was there held competent solely
on the ground that he had no interest in the suit. It is pointed out in
these cases that Weiermueller v. Scullin19 overruled on that same ques2
tion the case of Curd v. Brown o which held that the death of one party
left the other in the same position as a witness at common law-incompetent if interested. The true rule was there laid down to be that the
death of the opposite party and not interest was the thing which disqualified the survivor.
In Carroll v. United Railways Co.,21 in which the agent of an individual contracted with the deceased agent of the corporation, it was
held that the agent of the individual was disqualified from testifying
concerning the transaction. In Taylor v. George,22 it was held that an
agent of an individual who made a contract with the deceased party
was incompetent. These cases consider Griffin v. Nicholas23 which did
not raise the question of an agent's competency, as contra to Clark v.
Thias because it was said that the spirit of the statute as well as its
letter was to be carefully looked to in interpreting it. In Diggs v. Henson 24 the defendant's testator sold land to an agent of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff brought an action for breach of covenant of warranty and it
was held that the agent was incompetent to testify concerning the
transaction with the deceased. However, it was not shown whether
the deceased knew he was dealing with an agent, so that the case
18. Edwards v. Warner (1900) 84 Mo. App. 200: Donnell Newspaper Co.
v. Jung (1899) 81 Mo. App. 577 ; Green v. Ditsch (1898) 143 Mo. 1, 44 S. W.
799; Carroll v. United Railways Co. (1911) 157 Mo. App. 249, 137 S. W. 303;
Taylor v. George (1913) 176 Mo. App. 21o, 161 S. W. 1187; Diggs v. Henson
(1914) 181 Mo. App. :34, 163 S. W. 565.
19. (1907) 203 Mo. 466. 101 S. W. 1088.
20. (1899) 148 Mo. 82, 49 S. W. 990.
21. (1911) 157 Mo. App. 249, 137 S. W. 303.
22. (1913) 176 Mo. App. 215, 161 S. W. 1182.
23. (1909) 224 Mo. 275, 123 S. W. 1063.
24. (1914) 181 Mo. App. 34, 163 S. W. 565.
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might have been one of undisclosed principal. If so, it might have been
held on that ground that the agent was a party to the contract and
therefore disqualified.
In Drew v. Wabash Railway Co.,25 the plaintiff who had been forcibly ejected from a train by the defendant's conductor since deceased,
was held competent to testify as to what took place. The court recognized the rule of Williams v. Edwards, but held that it did not apply to actions ex delicto arising from the wrongful acts of an agent of a
corporation. But in Darks v. Scudder-Gale Grocer Co.,26 where the plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of her husband who had been poisoned by
medicines bought from a deceased agent of the defendant corporation
by the partnership of which he was a member, it was held a living
partner was competent to testify. The court disapproved the distinction made in Drew v. Wabash Railway Co., tho Its decision was put
on the ground that the partner had no interest In the suit. The
result of the principal case was not therefore impelled by the decision in
Darks v. Scudder-Gale Grocer Co.
It is submitted that the cases disqualifying agents involved a big
extension of the statute, and that Leavea v. Southern Railway Co.
marks its further extension. The terms of the statute do not necessitate its application to actions ex delicto except as to actual parties to
the action. The result of applying it to agents of parties may be to
discourage compromise, for a person Injured on a railroad should
now hasten to file suit and have a trial of the case if plenty of testimony is not available, in order to avoid his own disqualification as
a witness. For this 'reason, and because the decision unnecessarily
extends a statute which In itself is of doubtful wisdom, It is deemed
unfortunate that Drew v. Wabash Railway Co. was not adhered to by
the Supreme Court.
LAURANCE M. HYDE
GUARANTY-SUIT AGAINST MAKER AND GUARANTOR JOINTLY. Roark
v. Ideal Epworth Acetylene
o.-In
this case the plaintiff brought
suit against an obligor and a guarantor jointly, the latter having
been the original obligee and having assigned the contract obligation to the plaintiff and guaranteed its payment.' The Kansas City
Court of Appeals held that an obligor and guarantor may thus be
sued jointly.
At common law so entirely distinct and independent was the contract of the guarantor of a note from that of the maker that they
could be sued only separately.2 The first statute, which was almost
25. (1909) 129 Mo. App. 459, 107 S. W. 478.
26. (1910) 146 Mo. App. 246, 130 S. W. 430.
1. (Mo.. 1915) 175 S. W. 84.
2. Maddox v. Duncan (1898) 143 Mo. 613, 619; Hill v. Combs (1901) 92
Mo. App. 242, 253.
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indentical with the present statute, was passed in 18493 and in 18654
was amended to its present form which is as follows: "Every person who shall have a cause of action against several persons, includIng parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes and
be entitled by law to one satisfaction therefor, may bring suit thereon
jointly against all or as many of the persons liable as he may think
proper," 5 By virtue of this statute it was early held in Holland v.
Huntonf that the maker and indorser of a promissory note could be
jointly sued, and this result was later approved obiter in Meis v. Geyer.7 But in the famous case of Graham v. Ringo,s the Supreme Court
held, in accord with a previous dictums and without reference to the
above statute, that the maker and guarantor of a promissory note
could not be sued jointly. The following year the St. Louis Court
of Appeals in a memorandum opinionio reached the same result, tho
it had just held in another memorandum opinion that the maker and
Soon afterindorser of a note may be sued jointly before a justice."
ward the Supreme Court in Parmerlee v. Williams,12 again without
reference to the statute, followed Graham v. Ringo, and both cases
were approved In a dictum in Priorv. Kiso's three years later.
4
In the leading case of Maddox v. Duncan,1 the defendant had as"Waiving notice and prosigned a note in the following manner:
test and demand, I assign the within note to Samuel Grant for value
received and I guarantee the payment of it." When sued in one count
as indorser and in another as indorser and maker the defendant pleaded
the ten year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court held that the
defendant was an indorser and not a guarantor and that payments on
the note by the maker did not arrest the running of the statute of
limitations as to the indorser; it was said obiter that while at common law the defendant and the maker could not be sued jointly, yet
they could be joined under the statute.15 The court did not purport
to overrule Graham v. Ringo, nor are the cases necessarily inconsistent for Graham v. Ringo dealt with maker and guarantor; the
dictum in Maddox v. Duncan dealt with maker and indorser. It has
been doubted in later cases whether these remarks in Maddox v. Dun5
can were really obiter,1 but it seems clear that they were not necessary to the decision of the case; the indorser was the only one be3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Laws of 1849, p. 76. 8 8.
General Statutes 865, p. 651, § 6.
Revised Statutes 1909, § 1734.
(1852) 15 Mo. 475.
(1877)

4 Mo. App. 404.

8. (1878) 67 Mo. 324.
9. Central Savings Bank v. Shine (1871) 48 Mo. 456, 464.
10. Greely v. Cohen (1879) 7 Mo. App. 596.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

Deshon v. Leffler (1879) 7 Mo. App. 595.
(1880) 71 Mo. 410.
(1883) 81 Mo. 241, 249.

(1898) 143 Mo. 613.
Revised Statutes 1899, 8 1995.
Write-Away Pen Co. v. Buckner (Mo. 1915) 175 S. W. 81.
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Ing sued and the only justification for this reference to the joinder
was to point out that even admitting the maker and indorser could
by the statute be sued jointly, yet the statutory remedy would not
change the indorser to a joint maker or co-obligor so as to make the
statute of limitations the same for the indorser as for the maker.
In Hill v. Combs,17 the Kansas City Court of Appeals held that
several guarantors who signed on the back of a promissory note at
different times could be sued jointly under the statute. The court
said obiter, In reference to the effect of Mad-dox v. Duncan on the prior
decision of Graham v. Ringo; "We take it from the language employed
In the above excerpt [from Maddox v. Duncan] that the court meant
to decide and did decide that the maker and guarantor of a promissory
note may be sued thereon jointly. But it may be that we are in error
In supposing the case has gone to this extent, but whether this is the
one way or the other is perhaps unimportant in the present case." As
pointed out above, what was said in Maddox v. Duncan was dictum
and when the Supreme Court said the effect of the statute would
probably be that the defendant and the maker could be sued jointly it
had previously decided that the defendant was an indorser, not a
guarantor, so that even assuming the dictum was right (in accord with
Holland v. Huntonls and Meis v. Geyer,19) still it is not authority for
saying that the maker and the guarantor can be sued jointly. Perhaps
the obigations of the indorser and guarantor are not so fundamentally
different as to warrant a distinction as to joinder. The statute In
providing for joinder where one has a cause of action against several
persons and is entitled to one satisfaction, may be broad enough to
allow the maker and guarantor to be jointly sued, but the Supreme
Court has not yet overruled Graham v. Ringo and Parmerlee v. Williams. The clause, "including parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes," may be broad enough to allow the maker and indorser to
be joined, and still not warrant the joinder of the maker and guarantor.
By the weight of authority an indorser is a party to the bill of exchange or note.20 His "indorsement must, as a general rule, be somewhere on the paper itself or attached thereto, and unless it is the
party cannot be held liable as an indorser."21 But the contract of
guaranty may be contained in a separate Instrument, and even if written on the note itself, the action against the guarantor is not on the
note but upon his separate contract of guaranty. However, in Hill v.
Coombs,22 the Kansas City Court of Appeals decided that when two
17.

(1001) 92 Mo. App. 242.

20.
21.

33 L. R. A. (N. a.) 175 note.
1 Daniels, Negotiable Instruments (6th ed.) 765.

(1852)
(1877)

15 Mo. 475.
4 Mo. App. 404,

22.

(1902)

93 Mo. App. 264.

18.
19.

5
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persons sign their names on the back of a note for the purpose of allowing the payee to raise money thereon they are guarantors and
jointly liable; and on the authority of Maddox v. Duncan the court
said obiter that they could be sued jointly with the payee who indorsed.
In Taney County Bank v. Bray,23 the Springfield Court of Appeals held that the payee of a note who indorses it thus, "For value
received I hereby guarantee payment of the within note, and waive
demand and notice of protest on same when due," was a guarantor
and could be sued jointly with the maker. But the Supreme Court in
Maddox v. Duncan had previously held that such an assignment was
an indorsement, not a guaranty; and the result of Taney County Bank
v. Bray may be explained on the authority of Holland v. Hunton In
which the Supreme Court had held that an indorser and a maker could
be sued jointly. It is submitted that the Springfield Court's decision
Is therefore no authority for allowing a joint suit against a guarantor
and a maker.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals has recently held in London v.
Funsch24 that where the lessee of property and a third person entered into a joint contract by which they agreed to pay and guaranteed
the payment of rent, they could be sued jointly whether sureties or
guarantors. In a dictum the court said that "it is settled law that a
guarantor is neither an indorser nor a surety; that his undertaking
in his own separate and independent contract, is not a joint engagement with his principal and he cannot be sued with him," citing Graham v. Ringo.
In State ex rel. Jackson v. Bradley,25 the Supreme Court having
before it a question of jurisdiction,refused to say that Maddox v. Duncan had overruled Graham v. Ringo as to the point of joinder, but did
assert that the decision in Graham v. Ringo as to jurisdiction was still
sound. The Kansas City Court of Appeals in Write-Away Pen Co. v.
Buckner2- felt itself "justified in attaching some significance" to the
fact that the Supreme Court had thus approved Graham v. Ringo only
on the point of jurisdiction, and concluding that what was said in
Maddox v. Duncan concerning Graham v. Ringo was not dictum, held
that the maker and indorser of a promissory note could be sued jointly.
The result reached cannot be questioned, being in accord with the Supreme Court's decisions,27 but It was not necessary to conclude that
Graham v. Ringo had been overruled in order to reach that result.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

(1910)
141 Mo.
(Mo., 1915)
173 App.
S. W.692,
88. 125 S. W. 235.
(1906) 193 Mo. 33.
(Mo., 1915) 175 S. W. 81.

Holland v. Hunton (1852)

15 Mo. 475.
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Before the decision of Roark v. Ideal Epworth Acetylene 00.28
the situation was as follows: it was settled that the maker and indorser of a promissory note could be joined under the statute; the
Springfield Court of Appeals, had held that the maker and guarantor
could be joined, but its opinion that one defendant was a guarantor
was not in accord with the Supreme Court's decision in Maddox v.
Duncan so that its decision must be put upon the ground that the
suit was against an indorser and a maker; the Kansas City court in
a dictum had reached the conclusion that the maker and the guarantor
could be joined; the Supreme Court and the St. Louis Court of Appeals in early decisions had held that the maker and guarantor could
not be joined, and a recent dictum of the latter court had expressly
In Roark v. Ideal Epworth Acetylene Co., it
approved that result
was held that a company which "had sold and assigned its demand
and had guaranteed the payment" was a guarantor and could
be sued jointly with the maker. It is to be noted that in Maddox v.
Duncan a similar assignment and guarantee of a promissory note
was decided by the Supreme Court to be an indorsement rather than
a guaranty. The instrument in the present case, altho it is not given
in haec verba, was probably not a promissory note but a bill of sale,
and as such it could not technically be indorsed. Assuming that the
question of joinder of obligor and guarantor is squarely raised, the
court was compelled to determine whether Graham v. Ringo had been
overruled by a later decision of the Supreme Court. The Kansas City
court frankly admits that "there is room for a reasonable and serious
difference of opinion." It concluded that Maddox v. Duncan had overruled Graham v. Ringo, but this seems to have been due to a misconception of those cases. The foregoing analysis has shown that Graham v.
Ringo has not been modified by the Supreme Court, and that the confusion in the opinions of the courts of appeals Is due to a failure to
distinguish between a suit against maker and indorser and a suit
against maker and guarantor. It is submitted that Graham v. Ringo
is not to be abandoned because it was decided without reference to the
statute, and that the decision in Roark v. Ideal Epworth Acetylene Co.
fails to follow the latest controlling decision of the Supreme Court,
the effect of which was correctly stated by the St. Louis Court of Ap-

peals in London v. Funsch.

JAMES

P.

HANNIGAN

Moser
INFANTs-RATFICATION OF CONTRACTS UNDER TIiE STATUTE.
v. Renner'-The plaintiff while an infant bought a drug store from the
defendant, paid part of the purchase price and gave his promissory
Immediately on attaining majority the
notes for the remainder.
28. (Mo., 1915) 175 S. rW 84.
1. (Mo., 1915) 179 S. W. 970.
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plaintiff notified the defendant that he elected to rescind the sale. The
defendant refused to surrender the notes or to repay the purchase
money, tho the plaintiff offered to return the drug store with its
stock. Thirty days later the plaintiff brought this action seeking cancellation of the notes and judgment for the amount of the purchase
money paid; during these thirty days the plaintiff had kept the store
and had sold no goods, tho after the suit was filed he sold bandages
of the value of five dollars. The court gave the relief sought and held
that there had been no affirmance by the infant. The court seems to
have been of the opinion that a ratification by the infant would be effectual only if accomplished by one of the methods enumerated in
the statute.
The common law principles as to the ratification of an infant's
contracts prevailed in Missouri until 1879, when it was enacted that
"no action shall be maintained whereby to charge any person upon any
promise made after full age to pay any debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification after full age of any promise or simple
contract made during infancy, unless such promise or ratification shall
be made by some writing signed by the party to be charged thereby."Z
This statute was expressly repealed in 1895 and superseded by the
present statute which provides that "no action shall be maintained
whereby to charge any person or any debt contracted during infancy,
unless such person shall have ratified the same by some other act
than a verbal promise to pay the same; and the following acts on the
part of such person after he becomes of full age shall constitute a
ratification of such debt: first, an acknowledgment of or promise to
pay such a debt made in writing; second, a partial payment upon such
debt; third, a disposal of part or all of the property for which such
debt was contracted; fourth, a refusal to deliver property in his possession or under his control for which such debt was contracted, to
the person to whom the debt is due, on demand thereof made in writ-

ing."3
The common law made a distinction between ratification of an
executory contract and ratification of an executed contract. An arfirmance of an executory contract could be made by the late infant
4
only by an express or Implied promise to perform, made with a
knowledge of the facts and with a deliberate purpose of assuming liability.5 But of an executed contract a mere acknowledgment or act
8
indicating an intention to be bound by the contract was a ratification;
thus, a disposal by the late infant of the goods which were the conRevised Statutes 1879, 4 2516.
Laws of 1805, p. 181, Revised Statutes 1909, t2786.
4. Reed v. 'Boshears (1856) 36 Tenn. 118; 2 Greenleaf, Evidence (10th
ed.) § 367.
5. Baker v. Kennett (1873) 54 Mo. 82.
6. Hugh v. Carondelet (1874) 56 Mo. 202.
2.
3.
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sideration of the executed contract was a ratification of it.T Acceptance
of a part of the purchase price after reaching majority was such a
ratification of a deed as to prevent later disaffirmance.8
It is obvious that the Act of 1879 was not merely declaratory of
the common law on the subject of ratification of infant's contracts. As
the act is exclusive in its terms, an action to charge the late infant
on his debts, promises and contracts made during infancy can be maintained only if there has been ratification by the statutory method. The
statute seems to refer only to promises and contracts executory on the
part of the infant, for the words are that "no action shall be maintained whereby to charge" a person on a debt, promise or contract
made during infancy. Hence it is doubtful whether the act has any
application to executed contracts, 4. e., to contracts fully performed on
the part of the infant. Therefore the common law still prevailed as
to ratification of the executed contracts, and ratification by a common law method ought still to bar disaffirmance. Moreover, it would
seem that an adult might still ratify his debts and executory contracts
entered into during infancy in a way not provided by statute so as to
bar his later disaffirmance, altho it would not render him liable In a
suit on the debt. If an infant buys a horse and pays part of the purchase price, and after attaining majority orally promises to pay the rest
of the purchase money, this would not render him liable in an action
for the balance of the purchase money; but should the infant seek to
disaffirm this contract and sue to recover the purchase price paid for
the horse during infancy, the defendant ought to be allowed to plead
this oral promise as a bar to the plaintiff's action. Such a result is not
inconsistent with the words or intent of the statute. There appears,
however, to be no case on the point.
The statute of 1878 was expressly repealed in 1895 and superseded
by the present statute which Introduced new methods of ratification not
recognized at common law or under the earlier statute. A written acknowledgment will render the late Infant liable for his debts tho It
would not at common law, and probably would not under the preceding
statute. Part payment is also a ratification under the later statute
so as to charge the late Infant for the rest of the debt, tho it would
not have been a ratification at common lawo; but for part payment to
amount to a ratification it must be voluntary and on a debt which the
payor at the time recognizes as a subsisting debt against him.lo Ratification by disposal of the property for which the debt was contracted
was recognized at common law; disposal is not effected by user, but
7.

Chesire V. Barrett (1827)

4 McCord (S.

C.)

241; Lynde v. Budd

(1830) 2 Palge (N. Y.) 191: William8 v. Mabee (1849) 7 N. J. Eq. 500.
8. Hiqhle1 V. Barron (1871) 49 Mo. 103.
9. Whitney v. Dutch (1817) 14 Miss. 457; Hurely v. Margaritz (1846)
8 Pa. State 428: Catlin v. Haddow (1882) 49 Conn. 492; Rapid Transit Land
Co. v. S ndford (Tex. Civ. App., 1893) 24 S. W. 587.

10.

Snyder v. Geriche (1903) 101 Mo. App. 647, 74 S. W. 877.
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connotes alienation as by sale, gift or devise.1 The final method
of ratification under the staute of 1895 was not recognized under the
earlier act or known to common law; the effect of it is that a mere
refusal to disaffirm, i. e., a refusal to deliver the property for which the
debt was contracted to the vendor on demand made in writing, amounts
to a ratification. So immediately after the infant attains majority, the
vendor can force the issue and compel him either to disaffirm by delivering the property to him or to affirm by refusing so to do.
There are, however, at least two classes of cases in which an adult
is probably liable for debts contracted during infancy without proof
of any ratification by the statutory method. In Hortsmeyer v. Connorsi2
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant while an infant requested him
to pay certain taxes assessed against the defendant's land. The plaintiff
did so and brought suit against the defendant for that amount after the
infant became of age. It was held that the plaintiff had stated a good
cause of action, altho he had alleged no facts showing that the infant
had affirmed his promise by the method provided under the Act of 1879.
There appears to be no case squarely deciding that an infant partner
must on reaching majority affirm the partnership debts by the statutory
method before his share in such property will be liable on execution for
the partnership debts, but there is a strong dictum in Hill v. Bell' to
the effect that an adult partner has a right to insist upon the assets of
the firm being applied to the firm's debts and that the infant's right to
rescind is "subject to this equity." No mention was made of need to
affirm by the statutory method.
The statute of 1895 was less extensive than the statute of 1879 in
that the later act referred only to debts contracted during infancy,
whereas the earlier one referred in addition to promises and simple contracts made during infancy. Since the earlier act abrogated the
common law with regard to a ratification of infant's contracts,
debts and promises so as to render the infant liable in a suit
thereon, it becomes important to determine to what extent, if any, the
common law was restored by the repeal of the first act and the enactment of the second. A statute provides that "when a law repealing a
former law, clause or provision is itself repealed, such law, * * * *
shall not be revived unless it be otherwise expressly provided.""4 This
has been construed in dicta in two cases to mean that the repeal of a
statute which abrogates the common law does not revive the common
law.15 But the court in Koerner v. Wilkinson 6 admitted obiter that
the simple repeal of a statute abrogating the common law restores the
11.

Koerner v. Wilkinson (1902) 96 Mo. App. 510, 70 S. W. 509.

12. (1893) 56 Mo. App. 115.
13. (1892) 111 Mo. 35, 19 S. W. 959.
14. Revised Statutes 1909, 4 8060.
15. State v. Slaughter (1879) 20 Mo. 484, 487; Hindman v. Springfteld
(1899) 80 Mo. App. 581, 583.
16. (1902) 96 Mo. App. 510, 70 S. W. 509.
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common law. This view is in accord with decisions in other jurisdictions,17 and it would seem to be the sound view that if the statute of
1879 had been simply repealed, the common law would have been restored. But the court in Koerner v. Wilkinson further says that since
the statute of 1879 was not simply repealed but was superseded by another act on the same subject, the common law was not revived except
to the extent of its reenactment in the later statute. This would lead
to a strange result. The earlier statute referred to debts, promises and
simple contracts made during infancy; whereas the later one referred
only to debts contracted during minority, and did not extend to promises
and contracts which do not give rise to a debt. So if by the repeal of
the first act and by the enactment of the second, the common law was
not revived to the extent that it was not inconsistent with the second
act, there would be neither common law nor statutory law on the subject
of affirmance of promises and simple contracts made during minority
which did not charge the Infant with a debt. It would mean that an
adult could by no act, word or writing ratify a contract or promise made
during infancy which did not give rise to a debt, and that he could never
be sued on such a promise or contract.
Assuming, then, that the common law was restored to the extent
that it was not inconsistent with the statue of 1895, a promise or a
simple conract which is still executory and which does not give rise
to a debt may be ratified by methods recognized at common law. Such
a result would not be Inconsistent with the terms or intent of the statute.
Thus, If an infant continues under a contract of service after he becomes of age without demanding increased wages, it Is evidence of his
affirmance of the contract.Is
The statute of 1895 is similar to the statute of 1879 in that it has
to do only with a ratification which will charge the late infant when
sued on his debts. Hence under the later statute, just as under the
earlier one, the infant should be allowed to ratify by a common law
method his executory contracts which do give rise to debts so as to
.bar his later disaffirmance, altho such ratification would not render him
liable in a suit on the debt. He can also under this statute ratify his
executed contracts by a common law method so as to bar his later disaffirmance.
The court in Moser v. Renner seems to have been of the opinion
that a ratification by the late infant would be effectual only if accomplished by one of the methods enumerated in the statute. This case,
17.

State v. Roitns (1837)

6 N.

r.

550; Booth v. Commonwealth (1861)

16 Grattan (Va.) 519: Insurance Co. Valley of Virginia V. Barley (1863) 16
Grnttan (Va.) 519. These two Virginia cases were decided under a statute
similar to 4 8060, Revised Statutes 1909. Moseley v. Brown (1882) 76 Va.
419: Se" Afoihewson v. Phoeni.r Iron Foundry (1884) 20 Fed. 281: Beaven v.
Went (1895) 155 I1. 502, 41 N. E. 91; Baum v. Thomas (1898) 150 Ind. 378,
60 N. 1. 357; Donaldson v. State (1903) 167 Ind. 553, 67 N. E. 1029; Reeves
v. Russell (N. D., 1914) 148 N. W. 654.
18. See Spicer V. Earl (1879) 41 Mich. 191.
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however, was not one in which the late Infant was being sued on a debt
contracted during infancy, but one in which the late infant sought to
disaffirm the purchase made during infancy which purchase had
charged him with a debt. It would seem, therefore, that the infant's
ratification ought to have been determined on common law principles,
and it is submitted that it was improper to refer its determination to
the statute. But the acceptance of this view would not have changed
the result of the decision for the prompt disaffirmance was clearly effectual according to common law principles. The court fell into a very
natural misapplication of the statute, which seems to have been very
inartistically drafted, and which ought to be cleared up by amendment.
GARDNER SMITH

PARENT AND CHILD--DUTY o FATHER TO SUPPORT CHILD HELD BY
MOTHER IN ANOTHER STATE. Assm rn v. Assman.1-This was an action
by a wife who was living apart from her husband to recover the expense
of the care, keep and education of their minor son. The wife left the
husband, who was apparently not at fault, and later abducted the child
and took it to New York without the husband's consent. The father
made no effort to regain the custody of the child, but sent his clothes
and wrote a letter enjoining him to obey his mother. Later the father
met the child on a street in Brooklyn and conversed with him. The
St. Louis Court of Appeals denied recovery under these circumstances,
being chiefly influenced by the fact that the child had been taken to a
distant state where the support was furnished.
In some jurisdictions the parent's obligation to support a minor
child is considered to be moral and not legal,2 with the consequence
that the parent Is liable for necessaries furnished to the child only
where authority has been expressly or impliedly given. But In a
majority of American jurisdictions the obligation of the parent is considered to be a legal one, and when the parent omits or neglects to
discharge it the law imposes an obligation to pay for necessaries furnnished by a third person.3 The basis of the parent's liability in such
cases is the relationship between the parent and the child and the
liability Is quasi-contractual. In some states the duty of supporting
a child Is imposed by statute. It is not clear whether in Missouri the
obligation is legal or merely moral. In Holt v. Baldwin,4 it was held
that a father was liable for necessaries furnished to the child only in
the event that he had given authority for the purchase, either expressly
1.
2.

(1915) 179 S. W. 957.
Sheldon v. Springett (1831)

11, C. B. 462; 17 Halsbury's Laws of

England, p. 114: Kelly v. Davis (1870) 4) N. H. 187; Gordon v. Potter (1848)
17 Vt. 348; Mlcfillen v. Lce (1875) 78 I1. 443; Freeman v. Robinson (1876)

38 N. J. Law 383.
3. Porter v. Powell (1890) 79 Iowa 151.
4. (1870) 46 Mo. 265.
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or impliedly, and the court seems to have been of the opinion that there
was no legal duty to provide necessaries. Holt v. Baldwin seems to have
been entirely neglected in later decisions and the courts have since
shown a disposition to impose a legal duty on the parent apart from
any theory of agency.5 In view of the statute making it a criminal
offense for a father to fail to support a childO and in view of the fact
that there is no general system of public relief in Missouri as there
was in England at the time when the common law took root, it would
seem entirely proper to enforce the parent's duty as a legal obligation
without resort to the theory of agency.
Admitting that the parent has a legal obligation to pay for necessaries furnished to the child, there must be some limits on its enforcement. If the child is living with its father it is presumed that necessaries are being furnished by him and a "tradesman who credits an
infant does it at his peril."7 In Rogers v. Turner,s a child who was living at home was treated by a physician without his father's consent, and
it was held that since the father employed a family physician who would
have cared for the child there was no liability upon the father. But in
Martz v. Fulhart,9 the plaintiff supplied necessaries to the child who
took them to his father's home and there consumed them with the
knowledge of the parent, and tho the purchase had not been authorized
the parent was held liable. The parent's obligation is not diminished
if the minor child is away from home with his consent,1o but when the
child has abandoned the parental roof against the wish of his parent
the latter's liability seems to be at an end."
This can be justified only
on the ground that to permit third persons to charge the parents for
necessaries furnished in such cases would encourage children to live
away from their parents' homes. If the father has driven the child
away from home thru cruelty or fear he can not avoid his obligation
to pay for necessaries furnished. In Huke v. Huke,12 a daughter who
had been driven from home sought to have future maintenance decreed
to her and it was denied because of the lack of a precedent. There
would seem to be no good reason why a court should not decree future
maintenance if its machinery Is adequate for the purpose; protection
to the child demands enforcement of the parent's obligation in this
manner so as to assure the support of the child. In Brosius v. Barker,13
it was held that a father was under no legal obligation to support his
5.

St. Ferdinand Loretta Academy v. Bobb (1873) 52 Mo. 357; Industrial

Home V. Fritchey (1881) 10 Mo. App. 344; Brosius v. Barker (1911) 154 Mo.
App. 657, 136 S. W. 18. Cf. Huke v. Huke (1891) 44 Mo. App. 308.
6. Revised Statutes 1909, . 4492; State v. Thornton (1901) 232 Mo. 288.
7. Perrie V. Wilson (1849) 10 Mo. 451; Van Valinburgh v. Watson (1816)
13 Johnston (N. Y.) 480.
8. (1875) 59 Mo. 116.

9. Martz v. Fulhart (1910) 142 Mo. App. 348, 126 S. W. 964.
10, Porter v. Powell (1890) 79 Ibwa 151.

11.
12.
13.

Brostu8 v. Barker (1911) 154 Mo. App. 651 136 S. W. 18.
(1891) 44 Mo. App. 308. Cf. Eldred v. Bldred (1901) 62 Neb. 613.
(1911) 154 Mo. App. 651, 136 S. W. 18.
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emancipated son since he was no longer entitled to the son's earnings
but it is submitted that while the duty to support and the right to the
child's earnings are usually concomitant, the former is not based on the
latter. The obligation of the parent has been created with a view to
protecting the child and not to protecting the parent, and to permit
emancipation to absolve the parent from the obligation to support is
to furnish the parent with a means of escape from the obligation imposed upon him by the law.
Nor does the obligation of the parent to support the child depend
upon the parent's right to the custody of the child. If the mother
procures a divorce because of the father's fault and if in the divorce
proceeding custody of the child is awarded to the mother, the father
remains liable for its support. 14 It would seem also that the father
should remain liable wherever the custody of the child is awarded to
the mother even tho the divorce should be given to the father, for the
fault of the wife,15 since the obligation is primarily the father's and
the child should be given the protection of his support apart from any
question of the mother's fault. It is submitted that the fault of the
mother should be material only in determining whether custody of the
child should be awarded to her, and that the father should never be
relieved of his duty to support the child as a means of punishing the
mother for her misconduct. It is competent for a court to put upon
the mother the duty of maintenance, and the above applies only where
the decree awarding custody is silent as to maintenance. The fact that
the mother is given alimony would seem to be irrelevant to the question
of liability for support.'6 Chester v. Chester17 seems to be opposed to
this conclusion; the mother had been awarded alimony and the custody
of the child, and five years after the divorce sought to be reimbursed for
the past maintenance of the child, and in overruling her motion the
court intimated that it might have been sustained if she had applied for
future maintenance. It seems difficult to justify the result of this
decision, and Chester v. Chester seems to have been overruled in Meyers
v. Meyers.18
It is difficult to see how in Assman v. Assmanl9 the father was relieved of his duty to support his minor child. It would seem that by
sending clothes to the child, enjoining its obedience to its mother and
failing to take any step to recover the custody of the child, tho he was
in its company in New York, the father really consented to the child's
remaining with its mother there. If these facts are sufficient to prove
14.

Viertet v. Viertel (1908) 212 Mo. 502; LltAoir7kI V. Lulcowslcl (1004)

108 Mo. App. 204; Cole v. Cole (1905) 115 Mo. Ap. 406.
15. Elliott v. Elliott (1908) 135 Mo. App. 42.

16.
supra.
17.
18.

19.

Lukowski v. Lukowski (1904)
(1885) 17 Mo. App. 657.
(1901) 91 MO. 151.
(1915) 179 S. W. 957.

108 Mo. App. 204; Viertel v. Viertel,
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consent, the fact that the mother wrongfully took the child from the
father would seem to be outweighed. Indeed, a mother living apart
from her husband may be entitled to the custody of a child tho prima
facie the father has the right to custody.20 If the parents in the principal case had been divorced and the wife had been awarded the custody
of the child and had taken it to a distant state, it is conceived that the
father's liability would have continued. It seems to have been assumed
by the court that the liability for support exists only when the father
can exercise his right to the custody of the child. It might be a hardship to force the father to go to a distant state to regain the custody of
the child, but in the principal case the father did go to the distant
state and might easily have retaken custody without a court proceeding.
It would seem not at all clear that the father should be relieved of
liability to support the child by reason of the difficulty in obtaining
its custody. Suppose the child had been taken to East St. Louis. Would
the court have reached the same result? Or suppose necessaries had
been furnished to the child by tradesmen who relied on the father's
liability and who were not induced to extend credit by the mother.
Might the father have defended an action by such tradesmen on the
ground that he had been wrongfully dispossessed of the child and prevented from regaining its custody because of its being kept in a distant
state? An analysis of the principal case would seem to indicate, therefore; first, that the father consented to the child's remaining with its
mother; second, that by reason of his failure to retake custody he
should not be given any advantage by reason of the fact that the child
was kept in a distant state; third, that the liability might well have been
imposed apart from any question of the difficulty of exercising the right
to the custody of the child. The result of the principal case may be
defended on the ground that the wife is not shown to have furnished
the child with the necessary support In reliance upon the father's liability, nor is it shown that she had any intention to extend credit to
Dox CHAPMAN
the father.21
PUBLIC SERVICE COMISSION-MEASU1E

OF RLvIEw

BY CouRTs.

Chi-

cago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission.lThe Public Service Commision ordered two intersecting railroads to
construct and maintain an exchange track or switch. A suit to review
this order was brought in the circuit court and from a judgment affirming the order an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, which held
that upon the facts shown by the record the imposition of the burden
20. Laws of 1913, p. 92. The principal case probably arose before the
enactment of the present statute.
21. See Flugul v. Henschel (1896) 6 N. D. 205; Everett v. Walker (1891)

109 S. C. 129.
1. (Mo., 1915) 181 S. W. 61.

11

LAW SERIES, MISSOURI BULLETIN

imposed by the order was unjust and the cause was accordingly re
manded to the circuit court with directions to render a judgment reversing the order of the Commission. The Public Service Commission
Act2 provides for a review of the Commission's orders by the circuit
court in the first instance and then upon appeal by the Supreme Court,
for the purpose of having their reasonableness or lawfulness inquired
into and determined. No new or additional evidence may be introduced
on the hearing in the circuit court and the cause is to be tried without
the Intervention of a jury as a suit in equity. In the Supreme Court
the original transcript of the record, testimony and exhibits certified
to by the Commission and filed In the circuit court, together with a
transcript of the proceedings in the circuit court, constitute the record
on appeal.
Basing Its statement upon these provisions of the statute the Supreme Court said that review of the orders of the Commision was by
trial de novo upon the record and that the court would give to the findings of the Commission such weight and consideration as it might deem
them entitled to under the law and the evidence as tho they were the
findings of a trial judge in an equity suit. This Is in effect a holding
that the orders of the Commission have no finality in any respect. They
may be set aside, not because the court finds that the Commission exceeded its statutory power, nor because the order is not based upon any
substantial evidence, nor because it Is confiscatdry, but simply because
the court would not have reached the same conclusion on the facts as
did the Commission. In such a situation the Commission is little more
than a board of masters in chancery and the effective administration of
the Public Service Commission Act is for all practical purposes taken
out of the hands of the Commission and put into those of the court
which for the time being becomes an administrative and not a judicial
tribunal. Such a conclusion is destructive of the purpose for which
such administrative commissions have been created, if, indeed, it does
not render the Public Service Commission Act unconstitutional and void
because of the imposition by the legislature of non-judicial functions
3
Commissions such as the Public Service Commission
upon the court.
of Missouri are agencies of the legislature established for the purpose
of more effectively regulating public services and utilities than would
be possible thru statutes enacted to meet individual situations. The
legislature has established general principles of regulation and has left
the application of these principles in a particular case to its delegate, the
Commission. The acts of the Commission are administrative and only
quasi-judicial and its orders are for the time being those of its creator,
4
the legislature.
2.

Laws of 1913, p. 641, 4 111; p. 644, 4 114.

State v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (Minn., 1915) 153 N. W. 247.
yard Law Review 545.
3.

4. Wyman, Jurisdictional Limitations Upon Commission Action, 27 Bar
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As the Commission is entirely the creature of the legislature it is
obvious that it can exercise only such power as the legislature has
given it and while it is conceivable that the legislature might attempt
to make the actions of the Commission subject in all respects to the
supervision of the court and its orders valid only when approved by the
courts, it is extremely unlikely that the legislature would do this. Certainly the courts should endeavor to construe the statute in such a way,
if this is at all possible, as to prevent the imposition of purely administrative functions upon them and at the same time to give the orders of
the Commission as much finality as is possible under constitutional
limitations.
The limits upon the finality of commission orders and upon court
action in reviewing such orders are clearly stated by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. R. Co.,5 as follows: "In determining whether an order of the
commission shall be suspended or set aside, the Supreme Court must
consider (a) all relevant questions of constitutional power or right;
(b) all pertinent questions as to whether the administrative order is
within the scope of the delegated authority under which it purports to
have been made; and (c) whether, even altho the order be in form within the delegated power, nevertheless, it must be treated as not embraced therein, because its authority has been manifested in such an
unreasonable manner as to cause it to be within the elementary rule
that the substance, and not the shadow determines the validity of the
exercise of the power;" but (d) the Supreme Court may not, "under the
guise of exerting judicial power, usurp merely administrative functions
by setting aside a lawful order upon our conception as to whether the
administrative power has been wisely exercised." In a recent case In
Illinois involving the validity of an order of the Public Utilities Commission of that state fixing freight rates, It was said that "the right
to review the conclusion of the legislature or an administrative body Is
limited to determining whether the board acted within the scope of its
authority or the order is without foundation In the evidence, or a constitutional right of the carrier has been infringed upon by fixing rates
which are confiscatory or Insufficient to pay the cost of the traffic and
return to the carrier a reasonable profit on the investment."6
The
same result has been reached in Minnesota under a statute having some
resemblance to the Public Service Commission Act in Missouri.7
If the Public Service Commission Act requires the courts to review
de novo the Commission's orders there Is nothing more to be said except
that it would seem desirable that the Act should be amended in this
5. (1910) 215 U. S. 452. See Interstate Commerce Commi8s8on v. Union
Pactf e 1t. R. Co., (1912) 222 V. S. 541.
I6 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul RY. CO. V. Public Utilities Commisaion
(1915) 268 Ily. 49.
7. State v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (Minn. 1915) 153 N. W. 247.
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respect, otherwise the usefulness of the Public Service Commission will
be greatly impaired and its effectiveness as an administrative body
largely destroyed. It would seem, however, that without much difficulty and, perhaps, more in accord with the legislative purpose, the
court might have held that the review provisions of the Public Service
Commission Act are to be applied only for the purpose of determining
whether the Commission has acted within its powers, and upon substantial evidence and not in violation of constitutional guarantees, and
that the validity of the Commission's orders so far as it depends upon
matters of fact, when they are not arbitrary and not confiscatory, is
unquestionable in review proceedings before the courts.
There is reason for thinking that the order of the commission reviewed in Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co., V. Public Service Commission wad
confiscatory inasmuch as it appeared from the facts stated in the opinion
that the expenses of constructing and maintaining the connecting track
in accordance with the order would be greater than the returns from
the traffic which might reasonably be expected to use it. If so, it
would seem that the statement as to the necessity of a review de novo
is only obiter.
ELDON R. JAMES
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